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THE SCOPE AND LIMITS OF OUR OBLIGATIONS TOWARD MEXICO

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Any comprehensive discussion of our relations with Mexico involves two distinct questions which, while closely related, should for the sake of clearness of analysis be kept separate.

There is, in the first place, the basic and fundamental problem involved in our relation to that section of the American continent of which Mexico forms a part; a relation so close and intimate that everything affecting its peace and welfare vitally affects our own national well-being.

The concept of national sovereignty has undergone considerable change during the last century. It is true that our modern system of international law rests on the idea of national sovereignty. This principle marked a healthful reaction against the claims of universal dominion of the Holy Roman Empire. Useful as this principle has been in developing a respect for the rights of weaker states, the solidarity of interests of certain groups of nations of western civilization has begun to make serious inroads upon the traditional idea of sovereignty. The growth of the European concert, the interests of certain temporary or permanent groupings, such as the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, all represent forces that have profoundly influenced and modified the doctrine of national sovereignty in European affairs.

Slowly, in many cases almost unconsciously, and in all cases without full recognition of the consequences involved, changes of a like nature have been taking place in international relations on the American continent. It is true that our national thought has not kept pace with the actual changes in international conditions, due to the fact that the foreign policy of the United States has been of a negative rather than of a positive character. We have been content with imposing certain prohibitions on Europe in her relations with the American continent. Even in those cases in which our government has been compelled to formulate the rudiments of a positive American

(in the sense of a continental) policy, the new principles have been invoked for the purpose of re-enforcing the prohibitions on European states rather than because of the desire to develop a distinctive, constructive American foreign policy. The establishment of a kind of trusteeship over San Domingan finances was justified by our government as the only way to avoid the dangers of European occupation and the consequent violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Instead of resting our action in this case on a frank and positive assertion of a special national interest in everything affecting the stability, welfare and progress of the West Indies, irrespective of the attitude of the European countries, we took refuge behind the purely negative principle of the possible dangers involved in European aggression.

The time has come when we must recognize that the doctrine of national self-protection includes far more than the Monroe Doctrine. As Dr. Patten has so well pointed out, the maintenance and improvement of the standard of living of the American workingman depend, in part, on an uninterrupted supply of tropical products from the West Indies and from Central America. The reduction of the price of meat, or at least the avoidance of an increasing cost, will depend in large measure upon the establishment and development of the cattle ranges of northern Mexico. Our great manufacturing interests look to an increasing extent to the vast mining resources of Mexico.

In short, national economic interests of a basic character, affecting the welfare, the standard of life and the industrial prosperity of our country, are inextricably bound up with the political stability and the economic progress of Mexico, Central America and the West Indies. When we add to these fundamental economic and social interests, considerations of a strategic nature, the vital relations of these sections of the American continent to the United States immediately become apparent. The acquisition of the Canal Zone has made of the United States a Central American as well as a North American power, and our national policy must hereafter be profoundly influenced by this change in our geographical relations.

We are interested in the welfare of Mexico, of Central America and of the West Indies primarily because their stability and progress intimately affect the well-being of our own people, and we are interested in their attitude toward us because that attitude has a distinct bearing on our national safety. This essential solidarity of interests carries with it as a logical and inevitable consequence,

a limitation on the freedom of action of all the parties concerned. Approaching the question from the broadest possible point of view, we are forced to the conclusion that national sovereignty is limited and modified by the larger interests of continental progress.

Approaching the situation exclusively from the point of view of the national self-protection of the United States, it is evident that, irrespective of any question of European interference, we cannot remain indifferent to a condition of disorder or instability in any part of Central America, in Mexico or in the West Indies. There is, therefore, an aspect of the Mexican situation which must not be lost sight of and which will remain one of the most important international problems confronting the United States even after all pending questions with Mexico have been settled.

The immediate problem with which we have to deal, however, and to which I am expected to address myself relates to the principles which should guide us in dealing with the anarchical conditions now prevailing in certain sections of Mexico.

Any discussion of our present relation to the Mexican situation, in order to be fruitful, must be undertaken in a constructive spirit and with a keen sense of the responsibilities involved. Mere destructive criticism not only serves no useful purpose but adds to the difficulties of the administration in dealing with the situation. The purposes which the President has had in mind in the formulation of his Mexican policy are so lofty that they should only be modified or abandoned after it has been demonstrated that the ends which he has in view are unattainable.

Before proceeding to an analysis of the conditions now prevailing in Mexico, it is well to bear in mind that the present unrest in Mexico is traceable to causes far deeper than the personal ambitions of petty local leaders. It is true that local politicians have taken advantage of the feeling of unrest to stir up civil strife, but the reason for their success in fomenting revolutionary movements is traceable to the economic and social changes that have taken place in Mexico during the last thirty years.

When President Diaz assumed power he found the country in the most primitive state of economic organization. The emphasis which he laid on the development of the natural resources of Mexico, the improvement in transportation facilities, the development of the mines, the establishment of manufactures, all contributed toward

raising the standard of life of a portion of the laboring population. This improvement, marked as it was, gave rise to a desire for further betterment, and created a feeling of discontent which soon found expression in secret political agitation.

Amidst this forward movement for improvement, the condition of the agricultural laborer remained practically unchanged. He found himself tied to the soil, with but little opportunity to better his condition. The existence of great landed estates made it impossible for him to look forward to securing a small piece of land, which he might call his own. Conscious of the improvement of the condition of the other classes of the laboring population, but seemingly cut off from all possibility of self-improvement, the discontent of the agricultural laborer added to the flame of political agitation.

There is no doubt that Mexico is passing through the throes of a social re-adjustment, and that it is not possible to return to the conditions that prevailed during the administration of General Diaz. It is evident, however, that this re-adjustment cannot take place without a government worthy of the name. The present anarchical conditions prevailing in Mexico are the expression of a deep unrest, but Mexico cannot advance to a higher economic and social level unless there exists an authority sufficiently strong to command respect for person and property in all sections of the republic.

Another factor which should not be lost sight of and which has contributed in no small measure toward bringing about the present situation, and which now enters as a complicating element, increasing the difficulties in the way of a satisfactory solution, is the conflict of foreign interests which has been raging in Mexico during the last ten years. Those who have watched the course of Mexican affairs have been deeply impressed with the struggle for supremacy that has been waged between two groups of capitalists, represented, on the one hand by a great British syndicate, and on the other by an American capitalist with no less powerful affiliations. This struggle has been usually represented as involving nothing more than a scramble for oil concessions. As a matter of fact it goes far deeper, involving vast railroad and agricultural interests.

The struggle began when President Diaz, apprehensive of the domination of American capitalists, sought to counterbalance this influence by fostering other foreign interests. The nationalization of the great Mexican trunk lines, the construction of the Tehuantepec

railroad by a British syndicate, the granting of important oil concessions to Lord Cowdray and his associates were all intended to establish and maintain a balance of power which would check the influence of the American group in governmental affairs. In other words, Diaz first sought to develop the economic resources of the country by a liberal and even lavish treatment of American capitalists, and then sought to curb their power through the fostering of a British counter-weight. It was this change in the policy of General Diaz which enabled Francisco Madero to count on the secret support of at least some of the American companies interested in Mexico. It is exceedingly difficult to estimate the precise effect of this struggle between foreign interests on the domestic situation, but every one is agreed that it enters as an important factor in explaining present conditions, and must be reckoned with in the ultimate solution.

It is evident, therefore, that while some of the elements in the situation now confronting the United States are relatively simple, there are others so complex, and in some respects so elusive that any constructive suggestions should be offered, not in a spirit of dogmatic infallibility but rather as an attempt to throw some light on a perplexing and dangerous situation.

It would be difficult to find another instance in the history of our country in which the real issues involved in a great national problem have been so befogged as in the discussion of the Mexican situation. If the clouds that have obscured our vision simply led to temporary misconceptions, which, in the due course of time, would disappear, and enable us to see the situation in its true light, we might well patiently await this period of clearer vision. Unfortunately, however, the situation presses for early solution and upon a satisfactory solution depend not only the peace of our country but also the well-being and possibly the independent national existence of sixteen millions of our neighbors.

Whether our policy toward Mexico has been right or wrong, we must not close our eyes to the fact that it has aroused serious opposition in all classes of the Mexican population, whether living within the district under control of the government at Mexico City or in the territory occupied by the insurgent forces. It has also aroused the opposition and rekindled the distrust of the countries of Central and South America, and has served to bring together the European countries in a combined determination to protect the interests of their citizens in case the United States fails to do so.

We find ourselves at the present moment in a condition of national isolation, unique in the history of the country, and which stands in marked and solemn contrast with the spirit of good will toward the United States which prevailed immediately prior to the meeting of the second conference at The Hague. With such vast spiritual and material interests at stake and with such consequences impending, it becomes a matter of patriotic duty, to make a careful and searching "*examen de conscience*," with a view to ascertaining not only whether we have adequately fulfilled our international obligations, but also whether the policy which we have pursued and are now pursuing is in harmony with the best interests of our country.

The most serious danger that we have had to face in connection with our recent policy toward Mexico is traceable to the fact that this policy rests on deduction from certain hypotheses rather than on the basis of fact and established principle. The President, in his solemn declaration of December 2, 1913, at a joint session of the two houses of Congress said:

There can be no certain prospect of peace in America until General Huerta has surrendered his usurped authority in Mexico; until it is understood on all hands, indeed, that such pretended governments will not be countenanced or dealt with by the government of the United States. We are the friends of constitutional government in America; we are more than its friends, we are its champions; because in no other way can our neighbors, to whom we would wish in every way to make proof of our friendship, work out their own development in peace and liberty. Mexico has no government.

There is something inspiring in the thought that the United States should become the sponsor and champion of constitutional government on the American continent; something which appeals to that spirit of service which is so deeply rooted in American national character. When, however, we stop to subject this policy, with all its implications, to careful analysis we are forced to the conclusion, first that it is unworkable in practice; secondly, that if the attempt is made to apply it, the results may be disastrous to the countries for whose benefit it is intended; thirdly, that it involves principles which will bring us into constant conflict with the republics of the American continent and will thus serve to undermine our influence in American affairs; and finally, that it means responsibilities which we neither are prepared to fulfill nor should be expected to undertake.

We cannot hope to get at the basic and fundamental principles in

the discussion of this question unless we are able to emancipate ourselves from the hypnotism of political catchwords, and squarely face the facts of the situation, however unwelcome they may be. Many years before he was mentioned for the presidency of the United States, Woodrow Wilson said:

Self-government is not a thing that can be "given" to any people, because it is a form of character and not a form of constitution. No people can be "given" the self-control of maturity. Only a long apprenticeship of obedience can secure them this precious possession.

Between this profound political truth, so felicitously expressed, and the principles contained in President Wilson's message of December 2, 1913, there exists an inherent, fundamental, tragic contradiction, responsible in large measure for the difficulties which now confront us.

Constitutional government does not mean any particular form of written instrument or any special form of governmental organization. No matter how admirable the written instrument may be, it will remain a hollow form unless the political system for which it provides stands in direct and organic relation with the political training, the political capacity, the political traditions and the political antecedents of the people. If this close and intimate relationship does not exist, the pressure of forces far more potent than human desire or human ideals will soon shape a political system which, however imperfect, will at least enjoy the advantage of being workable, and will be vitalized by the strength that comes from the adaptation of political institutions to national character and national needs.

It was the misfortune of Mexico, in 1857, to adopt a constitution which was not, and is not today, in harmony either with the political training or capacity of her people or with the primary requirements of her national development. The constitutional convention of 1857 was made up of a group of political idealists, who labored under the illusion that a written constitution can create democratic conditions but failed to perceive the fundamental truth that written constitutions in order to be helpful, yes, even workable, must faithfully reflect the political capacity, the standard of civilization and the economic and social requirements of the mass of the nation.

Instead of building up a constitutional system on the basis of these fundamental elements, the framers of the constitution of 1857

proceeded to devise a nicely balanced scheme of government, moulded after the Constitution of the United States, adding thereto some of the more democratic features of the French constitution. Instead of recognizing the fact that the long period of anarchy and civil strife which characterized the history of the country between 1810 and 1857 could only be brought to a close through a strong and highly centralized national government, they attempted to provide a system under which the individual states would enjoy a measure of local autonomy almost, if not quite, as great as that enjoyed by the states of the American Union. Not only did the framers of the constitution ignore the manifest political needs of the country, but in their enthusiasm for democratic institutions, they endeavored to build up a system based on universal suffrage in a country in which, at that time, 95 per cent of the population were illiterate.

The attempt to put the constitution of 1857 into operation served to perpetuate the condition of civil strife that had characterized the first four decades of national independence. The individual states not only lacked the financial resources for the building up of vigorous state institutions, but local politicians used their power for selfish personal purposes, which often took the form of aggression and open warfare against the self-constituted leaders of neighboring states. The result was that the period immediately after the taking effect of the constitution of 1857 is an unbroken record of local abuses, of sectional strife, and of a complete disregard of the personal and property rights of the inhabitants.

Whatever may be the ultimate verdict on the part played by Porfirio Diaz in the development of Mexico, the historian of the future must at least give him credit for a clear perception of the fact that the constitution of 1857 was unworkable, that the only hope of preserving the national unity and national integrity of Mexico, and of giving to her a place in modern civilization was to bring about the unification of the country through the subordination of local political leaders to the national government, a process which involved the practical nullification of the constitution of 1857.

These may be unwelcome facts, but it is not my present purpose to form any estimate of the rights and wrongs of Mexican political evolution, but rather to present the actual course of development; a development which shows clearly that the trend of constitutional growth and the conditions of constitutional government in Mexico

cannot be judged, if they are to be fairly judged, by those standards which we are accustomed to apply in the United States. However unwilling we may be to accept the situation, it is nevertheless a fact that the present constitution of Mexico is unworkable, and any attempt on the part of an outside power to force her to operate it is in reality condemning the country to the anarchical conditions which prevailed between 1857 and 1879.

The serious student of Mexican civilization can have no sympathy with the view that Mexico must have an arbitrary and tyrannical central government, ruthless in its methods and unmindful of the personal rights of the inhabitants. There is a wide difference between a strong, centralized, unified government and a tyrannical government. In fact, the real situation in Mexico is that the weaker the central government, the greater the suffering of the poor unprotected Indian because of the tyranny, the abuse and the corruption of local politicians and subordinate administrative officials.

In any estimate of Mexican political conditions, it must always be borne in mind that we are dealing with a nation essentially Indian in its ethnic make-up, and in which the percentage of illiteracy, while not accurately determined, is probably in excess of 90 per cent. It is a mistake to suppose that the population is a turbulent one; on the contrary, there is probably no people of the American continent more easily governed, but there is also none more easily misled by vicious, corrupt and self-seeking local politicians. One of the most difficult problems with which President Diaz had to deal was to free the agricultural and mining laborers from the oppression and the tyranny of the state and local officials. It was a herculean task, in which he was but moderately successful, but the measure of success which attended his efforts fully demonstrates where the primary requisities for political progress lay.

The sentiments expressed by President Wilson in his message of December 2, 1913, are dictated by a lofty idealism, but it is an idealism which bears but little direct or organic relation to the present needs and the present possibilities of Mexico. The intent, no doubt, was to formulate a policy helpful to Mexico, but when tested by the actual conditions of political life, the application of the constitutional standards formulated with such high purpose can have but one result, namely, to condemn the country to a prolonged period of anarchy, the outcome of which must be, either the complete disappearance of

every vestige of civilization or the armed intervention of the United States to preserve the remnants which still exist.

The untenableness of the position assumed by the government of the United States is clearly demonstrated by recent events in Haiti, and especially by the events in Peru. Whatever may be our judgment with reference to the rights and wrongs of the situation, it nevertheless remains a fact that the constitutional government of Peru was overthrown by a military conspiracy, to which, fortunately, our government did not attempt to apply the principle of constitutional sponsorship which is being applied to Mexico. The fact that the participants in this conspiracy base their action on the desire to prevent unconstitutional acts by the president of Peru does not alter the situation so far as the United States is concerned.

The attempt to set the standards to which the governmental organization and governmental procedure of a foreign country should conform must arouse the grave concern of every one interested in preserving the best traditions of American policy. The moment we go beyond our manifest right in requiring that the lives and property of our own citizens in foreign countries shall be duly safeguarded, we not only depart from the accepted principles of international law but embark without chart or compass upon waters so troubled that we run the risk of bringing disaster upon ourselves and disaster no less certain upon the peoples whom we are trying to serve. When we endeavor to dictate the conditions or terms of political activity in any foreign country, even a country toward which we occupy so exceptional a position as Mexico, we are arrogating to ourselves a power which cannot help but arouse resentment and we are attempting something for which we are peculiarly unfitted.

If the history of the last hundred years teaches any one lesson it is that we can best perform our mission on the American continent by the force of our example rather than by attempted interference in the internal affairs of our neighbors. A high regard for the sanctity of all our international obligations, and a firm resolve to promote the ends of social justice in our internal affairs will exert an influence on all the other republics of the American continent far deeper and far more lasting than any attempt to dictate to them the standards according to which their governments shall be organized and administered.

While the precise form of political organization which should

harmony with the training and capacity of the people, there are certain fundamental requisites of civilization indispensable to every country, no matter what its form of government. Unless life is protected, unless the fundamental personal rights are secure and unless adequate protection is given to property, civilization inevitably disappears. We have a real national interest in preserving these fundamental requisites of civilization in every part of the American continent, and this interest rises to the dignity of a national responsibility in countries toward which we occupy such an exceptional relationship as that which exists between Mexico and the United States.

The fact that Mexico is our neighbor, that over twenty thousand American citizens are resident in the republic, and that vast American interests amounting to over a billion dollars are at stake, place the country in a position totally different from that of any of the countries of South America. Everything that affects the peace, the welfare and the progress of Mexico is of interest to the United States. We can no more remain indifferent to the continued existence of disorder and anarchy in Mexico than we could have remained indifferent to those conditions when they existed in Cuba. The primary conditions of national self-protection, the fulfillment of our national obligations to Americans resident in Mexico, the performance of our duty in protecting the vast interests which our citizens have at stake in that country, and, finally, our larger obligations to the interests of western civilization, make it incumbent upon us to do everything in our power to preserve the primary requisites for the continued existence and development of this civilization. The relationship is not a personal one between the President of the United States and the President of Mexico, but involves the present and future welfare of sixteen millions of Mexicans as well as the heavy responsibilities which we have assumed for the lives and properties of our own citizens and the citizens of other foreign countries resident in Mexico.

Although we cannot insist upon any particular type of constitutional government in Mexico, it is our manifest duty to insist on the re-establishment of order, and to do everything consistent with a respect for Mexican dignity and sovereignty to contribute toward that end. It is a significant fact that at every period in our own history at which there has been a clash between constitutional government and the maintenance of order, constitutional government has always given way. The annals of our country between 1866 and 1871

obtain in any country must, in order to be effective, be in close bristle with illustrations of this fact. Are we then justified in insisting upon the application of political principles in a foreign country which we have not observed in our own? May we, in justice to ourselves and to Mexico, insist on conditions that condemn that country to anarchy, threaten it with disruption and jeopardize the very existence of civilized life?

However widely we may differ as to the proper course to be pursued in the present emergency, it is clear that the President's policy has not only thus far failed of its purpose to bring about the reëstablishment of constitutional government in Mexico, but has produced results opposite of what was intended. The arraignment of General Huerta contained in President Wilson's message of December 2, 1913, brought to Huerta's support elements of the Mexican population that were at first bitterly opposed to him; it aroused for him the sympathy of many of the republics of Central and South America, and gave to him an international prestige which he could not otherwise have attained.

The discussion of the principles that have guided the authorities in Washington in the adjustment of our relations with Mexico should be approached in a spirit of helpful coöperation. It is of little value to discuss what might have happened if a different policy had been pursued. In fact, in the present situation, such criticism is likely to do more harm than good. On the other hand, constructive suggestions may be of real value in furnishing the basis for public discussion, and in contributing toward the formation of an enlightened public opinion.

Through a misconception of the elements involved in the present situation, the violent nature of some of the attacks on President Wilson's policy and the partisan nature of others have created the impression that the first step toward any change in our policy more favorable to the constituted authorities at Mexico City involves the formal recognition of the Huerta government. As a matter of fact, we have been in constant official relations with the Huerta government through our chargé d'affaires in Mexico City. These communications have dealt not only with matters affecting the present revolution, but have covered a wide range of subjects in no way related thereto. The refusal to give immediate recognition to the Huerta government does not violate the traditions of American

practice. Nearly two years elapsed between the assumption of power by President Diaz (November 28, 1876) and the formal recognition of his government (May, 1878).

While, therefore, the President need not reverse his policy with reference to withholding recognition, the present situation demands that the first step in a constructive, positive policy toward Mexico is the removal of the international boycott and financial blockade which the United States has instituted against the Huerta government. This boycott is a serious departure from the best traditions of American foreign policy and amounts to a systematic attempt on the part of the government of the United States to overthrow the constituted authorities of a sister state. It is an open secret that foreign governments have been notified that the United States will regard it as an unfriendly act if they or their bankers advance money to the Huerta government, and it is an equally well known fact that when the fiscal agents of the Huerta government entered into negotiations with European bankers for the floating of loans, these banks were notified by their respective governments that the United States was opposed to any such advances. It is this boycott rather than the withholding of formal recognition which is weakening the Huerta government, and which is contributing toward intensifying the condition of anarchy in Mexico.

The events of the past few months have shown that the government at Mexico City is one that possesses at least some of the elements of national and international responsibility, and it becomes, therefore, our solemn duty to refrain from a policy calculated to cripple the only authority worthy of the name. Unless we are prepared to take this position, we must assume the responsibility for the condition of anarchy to which we condemn the country.

With the removal of the international boycott as the first step in a constructive foreign policy, the next step will be the reëstablishment of the embargo on the exportation of arms and ammunition, authorized by congressional resolution of March 14, 1912, established by President Taft by proclamation of the same date, and revoked by President Wilson on the third of February, 1914. [Since reëstablished. *EDITOR.*] It is true that the congressional resolution goes beyond the strict requirements of our neutral obligations, but it sets an example to the world of the desirability of placing these neutral obligations on a distinctly higher plane. In a recent report on the

neutrality laws of the United States prepared under the auspices of the Carnegie Peace Endowment, Dr. Fenwick, in commenting on the congressional resolution of March 14, 1912, said:

This conditional restriction of the most important contraband trade may appear at first sight contrary to the rule of international law that neutral states are under no international obligation to restrict ordinary commerce in contraband on the part of their citizens. But . . . a belligerent, whose territory borders upon that of a neutral, might, by storing supplies in a neutral town on the frontier and drawing upon them at will, practically convert the neutral town into a base of operations for its armies. In other words, the fact that the neutral and belligerent countries are contiguous may create such changed conditions as to overrule the application of the principle of the freedom of contraband trade.

If these principles are applicable to cases in which the United States occupies the position of a neutral toward two belligerents, the necessity for their application becomes more urgent when we are dealing with insurgents whose belligerency we have not recognized. The fact that this embargo strengthened the hands of the constituted government, made it possible for us to contribute within the measure of our power toward the maintenance of a united Mexico. The lifting of the embargo, through President Wilson's proclamation of February 3, 1914, has served to strengthen the insurgent movement, and has practically made our southern frontier a base of operations against the constituted government of Mexico. We are thus contributing not only to the perpetuation of a condition of anarchy, but to the actual disruption of the country.

The United States is interested in an orderly, a united, a progressive Mexico, and must carefully avoid any action that may lead to the disruption of that country. Any attempt, therefore, at a solution of the problem on the basis mentioned must carry with it due notice to the insurgents that the embargo will again be placed on the exportation of arms and ammunition, and that the United States will see to it that the Texas frontier shall no longer serve as a base of operations for the insurgent forces.

There has been much talk within recent months of a secession of the northern states of Mexico, and the formation of a separate republic. If such a disruption of the country does occur, the United States will have to bear part of the responsibility for this calamity. The formation of such a northern republic would be but the beginning of a series

of intrigues between discontented elements in that section of the country and the people of Texas, which would probably end in a movement for annexation. Such annexation would not serve any real national purpose, and would mean a grave wrong to the people of Mexico.

The modification of our Mexican policy to the extent above outlined will pave the way for further constructive measures for the solution of the present difficulties. We can then raise the Mexican situation to the dignity of a continental question by securing the coöperation of the leading powers of South America, namely the Argentine, Brazil and Chile, in the form of an offer of joint mediation coupled with friendly representations indicating the necessity of a termination of the conflict in Mexico, and the desirability of an agreement upon a third person, acceptable both to the Constitutionalists and to the constituted government to assume the provisional presidency pending the calling of a new election. It is hopeless, however, to attempt to secure such coöperation until the United States recedes from, or at least modifies its present purely negative attitude toward the Huerta government.

Although it is desirable that mediation be raised to the dignity of a continental question by the united action of the leading American powers, there is no reason why such mediation should not have the support of the European governments. Such support would be in entire harmony with the Monroe Doctrine. Joint action with the European powers becomes dangerous when it takes the form of joint armed intervention. Such intervention would involve the United States in endless controversies with European powers, and might ultimately lead to armed conflict. The joint intervention of the European powers in Mexico in 1861 demonstrates the worthlessness of any agreements as to the scope and limits of such intervention. On the other hand, we must not forget that the combined investment of European capital in Mexico is second in importance only to that of the United States. The most accurate calculation indicates that the sum total of foreign investments is as follows:

American.....	\$1,057,775,000
English.....	321,302,800
French.....	143,446,000
Other foreign nations.....	118,535,380

The present situation has become intolerable, and it is evident that it must soon be brought to a close or armed intervention will become inevitable. As was recently said by the *London Spectator*:

Mr. Wilson has become the sport of events. . . . This terrible state of affairs is the result of the primary error of supposing that you can dictate to a proud and independent country, and at the same time respect its independence. The excellence of his motives remains unquestionable among the havoc of anarchy which they have created. . . . A policy, however, must be judged by its effects, not by its motives. . . . Wilson tried to dictate to Huerta while pretending that Mexico was a free and independent country.

The country owes a deep debt of gratitude to President Wilson for the determined stand that he has taken against armed intervention. The sacrifice of life and of treasure which such intervention would involve, and the heavy responsibilities which would be placed upon us for many years to come, make it a matter of vital importance to exhaust every possible means to avoid such a calamity.

The support which the people of the country will give to a policy of non-intervention makes it all the more important that we should adopt a positive, constructive policy. No matter how strongly the President may be opposed to armed intervention, the present anarchical conditions in Mexico must be brought to a close or conditions will arise which will make armed intervention inevitable. There is a logic of events far more irresistible and far more compelling than the logic of the human mind. Unless, therefore, our Mexican policy is adjusted to the re-establishment of order within the republic we will soon find responsibilities thrust upon us which we will be compelled, however reluctantly, to assume.

For my own part I firmly believe that we involve ourselves in hopeless difficulties when we embark upon an international policy which attempts to dictate who shall or who shall not be the governing authorities in a neighboring but independent country. Our attitude toward the republics of the American continent should be inspired by a desire to be of service to them, whenever possible, but we should studiously refrain from interference in their internal affairs, unless such interference is dictated by overwhelming considerations of national interest or international obligation. We may well recognize once and for all time that our government can do but little to accelerate the development of democracy in any foreign country, and that in attempting to do so we are likely to do quite as much harm as good.

The United States must permit the countries of the American continent to work out their political destinies in their own way, confident of the fact that as the masses of their population advance in education, in economic power and social efficiency, the democratic development in which we are so deeply interested will proceed, slowly it is true, but productive of permanent results. Any attempt on our part to force upon them either our standards of conduct or our methods of political action will only serve to arouse their bitter opposition, and thus thwart any higher purpose that we may have in view.

NOTE. This paper was read at a meeting of the Academy, April 4, 1914.